SFG75
Well-Known Member
I bought this book after listening to a great discussion on C-SPAN which you can view here. There is also another good presentation which you can find here. While these sessions caught my eye, I made the commitment to buy the book after reading The New Republic's blistering review.
Rumsfeld's book is widely known for his explanation of how and why our policy in Afghanistan was the way that it was. I can remember criticism that the military force was too small and that many in the military felt that Rumsfeld didn't listen to their views. Of course, you can also follow the case that the reasons to start the war in Iraq, was tenuous and that alternative viewpoints where pushed aside. in regards to the former concern, Rumsfeld maintains that the generals didn't want more boots on the ground, but that what they wanted was more intelligence officers to help gain Afghan informants and the like. He documents asking repeatedly if more troops are needed, only to be told no by Tommy Franks and others. In regards to Iraq, Rumsfeld admits that the invasion took place due to many factors and that the Bush administration made a serious mistake in highlighting just one. He glosses over Powell's suggestion that he gave false information and that he was misinformed. All Rumsfeld said was; "no, he wasn't" and that was about it. Other than highlighting and documenting how the media got a few stories wrong that were detrimental to the war effort(i.e.-soldiers flushed the Koran down a toilet) Rumsfeld's book provides little ammunition regarding the decisions that were made about Afghanistan and Iraq.
This book was surprisingly refreshing though, in light of the obvious big two issues. The first half of the book outlines Rumsfeld's experiences in government and the real gem of this book is his detailed explanation of how each president he worked with, lead others and made decisions. When he was a representative, Rumsfeld noted how Lyndon Johnson kept index cards listing "favors" that politicians owed him. If a bill was pushed through with LBJ's help five years ago, he would pull out the same card when he needed a bill passed. Rumsfeld credits Nixon with great intelligence, who held conference with two competing groups of advisors, but who would bat around ideas with individuals on a whim in order to hash out certain disagreements. Surprisingly, he is critical of Gerald Ford's policy decision making style. Ford had a "spokes and hub" policy whereby advisors would come to him and speak to him directly. While this made advisors feel listened to and respected, they left no empowered to act on what they came to talk to the president about. Rumsfeld credits this policy with the foreign policy and domestic issues that plagued Ford's tenure.
In reading this book, you do not come away with a god picture of L. Paul Bremer or Condoleeza Rice. Bremer, to Rumsfeld, held off too long on giving authority back to Iraqis once he was the head of the Iraqi Provisional Authority. Rumsfeld details the infighting between the department of defense and state as being a reason why important decisions were left hanging. Rumsfeld's private career as a CEO of the company that invented Nutra-Sweet was also interesting to read. You do gain quite an insight into his long years of government and brief corporate service. This book is very good in regards to amusing anecdotes and retelling of certain events, though Rumsfeld's defense of his tenure in later government service is unconvincing.
Rumsfeld's book is widely known for his explanation of how and why our policy in Afghanistan was the way that it was. I can remember criticism that the military force was too small and that many in the military felt that Rumsfeld didn't listen to their views. Of course, you can also follow the case that the reasons to start the war in Iraq, was tenuous and that alternative viewpoints where pushed aside. in regards to the former concern, Rumsfeld maintains that the generals didn't want more boots on the ground, but that what they wanted was more intelligence officers to help gain Afghan informants and the like. He documents asking repeatedly if more troops are needed, only to be told no by Tommy Franks and others. In regards to Iraq, Rumsfeld admits that the invasion took place due to many factors and that the Bush administration made a serious mistake in highlighting just one. He glosses over Powell's suggestion that he gave false information and that he was misinformed. All Rumsfeld said was; "no, he wasn't" and that was about it. Other than highlighting and documenting how the media got a few stories wrong that were detrimental to the war effort(i.e.-soldiers flushed the Koran down a toilet) Rumsfeld's book provides little ammunition regarding the decisions that were made about Afghanistan and Iraq.
This book was surprisingly refreshing though, in light of the obvious big two issues. The first half of the book outlines Rumsfeld's experiences in government and the real gem of this book is his detailed explanation of how each president he worked with, lead others and made decisions. When he was a representative, Rumsfeld noted how Lyndon Johnson kept index cards listing "favors" that politicians owed him. If a bill was pushed through with LBJ's help five years ago, he would pull out the same card when he needed a bill passed. Rumsfeld credits Nixon with great intelligence, who held conference with two competing groups of advisors, but who would bat around ideas with individuals on a whim in order to hash out certain disagreements. Surprisingly, he is critical of Gerald Ford's policy decision making style. Ford had a "spokes and hub" policy whereby advisors would come to him and speak to him directly. While this made advisors feel listened to and respected, they left no empowered to act on what they came to talk to the president about. Rumsfeld credits this policy with the foreign policy and domestic issues that plagued Ford's tenure.
In reading this book, you do not come away with a god picture of L. Paul Bremer or Condoleeza Rice. Bremer, to Rumsfeld, held off too long on giving authority back to Iraqis once he was the head of the Iraqi Provisional Authority. Rumsfeld details the infighting between the department of defense and state as being a reason why important decisions were left hanging. Rumsfeld's private career as a CEO of the company that invented Nutra-Sweet was also interesting to read. You do gain quite an insight into his long years of government and brief corporate service. This book is very good in regards to amusing anecdotes and retelling of certain events, though Rumsfeld's defense of his tenure in later government service is unconvincing.
